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We analyze how foreign presence a⁄ects local ￿rm productivity. We relax the
standard implicit assumption that spillovers are immediate and permanent. We ￿nd
that spillovers are dynamic. Foreign entry of a majority foreign owned ￿rm has a
short run negative e⁄ect on the productivity of local competitors, which is more than
o⁄set by a longer run positive e⁄ect. The entry of minority foreign owned ￿rms has an
immediate, though short-lived, positive e⁄ect on local suppliers. The entry of majority
foreign owned ￿rms also improves the productivity of local suppliers, but the e⁄ect
materializes later and lasts longer.
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11 Introduction
When a ￿rm invests in a foreign country, it often brings with it proprietary technology to
compete successfully with indigenous ￿rms (Markusen, 1995). Believing that this trans-
ferred technology will be adopted by domestic ￿rms, host country policymakers often try to
implement policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Unfortunately, the literature
surveys of G￿rg and Greenaway (2004) and Crespo and Fontoura (2007) on FDI spillovers
conclude that there is no clear evidence of aggregate positive FDI spillovers.
FDI spillovers are commonly analyzed in a production function framework. Total factor
productivity at the ￿rm level is obtained in a ￿rst step estimation and in a second step
estimation FDI spillover variables are introduced as additional ￿ input￿variables to explain
domestic ￿rms￿productivity. The size and signi￿cance of the resulting coe¢ cients are then
taken as evidence of FDI spillovers. The literature distinguishes between spillovers to ￿rms
in the same industries (horizontal spillovers) and spillovers to ￿rms in other industries linked
to the foreign ￿rm through the supply chain (vertical ￿ back- and forward￿spillovers). These
are illustrated in ￿gure 1. Horizontal spillovers have received widespread attention, while the
vertical spillover discussion that was launched by McAleese and McDonald (1978) and Lall
(1980) was reignited by Schoors and van der Tol (2002) and took o⁄with the contribution of
Smarzynska Javorcik (2004). Following new theoretical insights that stress the importance
of ￿rm level heterogeneity in the study of ￿rms￿participation in international markets (see
e.g. Melitz, 2003 and Helpman et al., 2004), the spillover literature has analyzed ￿rm- (or
industry-) speci￿c characteristics that may mediate any positive spillovers. These charac-
teristics most often concern domestic ￿rms￿characteristics such as measures for absorptive
capability (see a.o. Merlevede and Schoors, 2007). The attention for foreign ￿rms￿charac-
teristics has been more limited (Marin and Bell, 2006, and Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008,
are the exceptions).
This paper adds dynamic aspects to the analysis of FDI spillovers. Although the literature
has acknowledged that FDI spillovers e⁄ects may require time to materialize, the empirical
literature has addressed this issue merely by using lagged values of spillover variables. This
approach is unsatisfactory. Since spillover variables are typically based on foreign ￿rms￿
share in total industry output (or employment), the spillover e⁄ect of all foreign investment,
new and old, is lumped together in one variable. Merely lagging the spillover variables does
not adequately address the dynamic nature of spillovers, since lagged variables still lump
together the e⁄ect of all previous foreign investment in one variable. The root of the problem
is that this aggregate approach implicitly assumes that the contemporaneous spillover e⁄ect
of a foreign ￿rm that entered in a given year t is identical to that of a foreign ￿rm that
2entered in any other year ￿t. This does not correspond with our understanding of the theo-
retical transmission channels of spillover e⁄ects. Teece (1977) for example already suggests
that technology imitation and worker mobility might be important channels of horizontal
spillovers, but neither the mobility of workers trained by foreign ￿rms, nor technology imi-
tation are likely to materialize in the very short run. Likewise, vertical spillovers driven by
access to better inputs produced by foreign ￿rms or by supplying inputs to multinational
companies are not necessarily instantaneous nor permanent. There is some circumstantial
evidence that timing may be important for spillover e⁄ects. For a panel (1982-95) of ￿rms in
the Irish electronics sector G￿rg and Ruane (2001) ￿nd indications that foreign ￿rms start
o⁄with a relatively low extent of local linkages, but as they get accustomed, they proceed to
develop more local input linkages. Giroud (2007) con￿rms this by comparing foreign ￿rms￿
perceived impact on local suppliers in Malaysia and Vietnam. Local suppliers bene￿t signif-
icantly less form foreign presence in Vietnam than in Malaysia, where multinationals have
been present for a longer period. Based on their AB Volvo case study Ivarsson and Alvstam
(2005) conclude that technology transfer to suppliers seems to be more e¢ cient in Volvo￿ s
older plants. The business literature further suggests that technology is not always easily or
rapidly transferred within multinationals (see e.g. Urata and Kawai, 2000) which may also
give rise to speci￿c time patterns in the transfer of technology to foreign a¢ liates and the
resulting spillovers. Given the above, the current ￿ static￿empirical approach may be inade-
quate to identify spillovers accurately. In addition to providing a better link between theory
and test, understanding the dynamic nature of spillovers also has clear policy relevance for
e.g. the ￿scal treatment of foreign investment. If foreign entry spills over in a positive level
shift of domestic ￿rms￿productivity, a temporary tax holiday seems appropriate (left aside
e.g. employment considerations in the foreign ￿rms), while a more permanent tax incentive
scheme may be warranted if foreign ￿rms are a source of a more continuous ￿ ow of positive
spillover e⁄ects.
Our results indicate the spillover e⁄ects of foreign investment on domestic ￿rm pro-
ductivity are dynamic indeed. Let us ￿rst look at the horizontal e⁄ects. Domestic ￿rms￿
productivity seems to bene￿t from the presence of majority foreign owned ￿rms in their
industry, although the majority foreign owned ￿rm needs to be present for at least four
years in the host country before domestic ￿rms experience a positive contribution to their
productivity growth. This may result from the fact that domestic ￿rms need to familiarize
themselves with the advanced technology introduced by majority owned foreign ￿rms, or
alternatively from the fact that worker mobility can only improve domestic ￿rm productiv-
ity if workers trained (long enough) by the foreign entrant later join a domestic ￿rm or set




















Figure 1: Horizontal, forward and backward spillovers through the supply chain
domestic economy more recently is negative, pointing to a short run negative competition
e⁄ect. The impact of the entry of minority foreign owned ￿rms on their local competitors￿
productivity is more moderate.
These minority foreign owned ￿rms do however generate immediate and strong positive
backward spillover e⁄ects to their local suppliers. The ￿rst two years after entry, domestic
￿rms enjoy a substantial contribution to productivity growth when supplying the minority
foreign owned entrant. If minority foreign owned ￿rms have entered the domestic economy
longer ago, the positive backward spillover e⁄ect fades away. Backward spillovers from ma-
jority foreign owned ￿rms are also positive and signi￿cant but not immediate. Foreign ￿rms
need to be present for at least a full year before domestic ￿rms are able to grasp positive
backward spillover e⁄ects. Although the e⁄ect lasts longer than for minority foreign owned
￿rms, it also fades out in the longer run. Most likely domestic ￿rms have closer ties with
minority than majority foreign owned ￿rms (because of the majority domestic participation
in the former), which ensures that positive spillovers of minority foreign investment materi-
alize quicker. But since the minority foreign owner has to share pro￿ts with a local partner
and has more reasons to fear technology leakage, he may bring in less advanced technology,
which makes the spillover e⁄ect of foreign minority investment smaller and fade out faster.
We do not ￿nd strong evidence for the existence of forward spillovers, a ￿nding that is in line
with most of the literature (see e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004, and Smarzynska Javorcik
and Spatareanu, 2008).
4This paper continues as follows. In section 2, we provide a description of our dynamic
approach FDI spillover. Section 3 lays out the data and estimation strategy. Results and
interpretation are provided in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A dynamic approach to spillovers
Horizontal spillovers run from a foreign ￿rm to a host country ￿rm in the same industry.
Teece (1977) suggests two main channels for horizontal spillovers: technology imitation (the
demonstration e⁄ect) and mobility of workers trained by foreign ￿rms (see also Fosfuri et
al., 2001, and G￿rg and Strobl, 2005). Marin and Bell (2006) ￿nd that training activities by
foreign subsidiaries are related to stronger horizontal spillovers. Foreign entry may also fuel
competition in the domestic market. Fiercer competition urges host country ￿rms to either
use existing technologies and resources more e¢ ciently or adopt new technologies and orga-
nizational practices, which provides another important channel of horizontal spillovers (see
Aitken and Harrison, 1999, and Glass and Saggi, 2002). None of these e⁄ects is necessarily
positive. Labor market dynamics may entail negative spillovers such as a brain drain of
local talent to foreign ￿rms to the detriment of local ￿rm productivity (Blalock and Gertler,
2004) or an overall increase in wages irrespective of productivity improvements caused by
foreign ￿rms paying higher wages (Aitken et al., 1996). Where foreign technology is easily
copied, the foreign investor may choose to avoid leakage costs on state-of-the-art technology
by transferring technology that is only marginally superior to technology found in the host
country (see Glass and Saggi, 1998). Such policies obviously limit the scope for horizontal
spillovers via demonstration e⁄ects. The higher productivity of foreign a¢ liates may also
lead to lower prices or less demand for the products of domestic competitors. If domestic
￿rms fail to raise productivity in response to the increased competition, they will be pushed
up their average cost curves. Ultimately, domestic producers may not merely fall behind,
but fall by the wayside, driven out of business by the shock of foreign entry (see Aitken and
Harrison, 1999, on this market-stealing e⁄ect). These partial e⁄ects are hard to disentangle
empirically and a general measure for horizontal spillovers will identify the net e⁄ect of all
these channels.
Figure 1 shows how backward spillovers run from the foreign ￿rm to its upstream local
suppliers. Thus, even if foreign ￿rms attempt to minimize their technology leakage to direct
competitors (horizontal e⁄ect), they may still want to assist their local suppliers in providing
inputs of su¢ cient quality in order to realize the full bene￿ts of their investment. In other
words, they want the inputs from the host country to be lower cost yet similar in quality
to inputs in the home country. If the foreign ￿rm decides to source locally, it may transfer
5technology to more than one domestic supplier and encourage upstream technology di⁄usion
to circumvent a hold-up problem. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) shows that the backward linkage
e⁄ect is more likely to be favorable when the good produced by the foreign ￿rm uses inter-
mediate goods intensively and when the home and host countries are similar in terms of the
variety of intermediate goods produced. Under reversed conditions, the backward linkage
e⁄ect could even damage the host country￿ s economy. Figure 1 also suggests how a forward
spillover goes from the foreign ￿rm to its downstream local buyer of inputs. The availability
of better inputs due to foreign investment enhances the productivity of ￿rms that use these
inputs. However, there is also a danger that inputs produced locally by foreign ￿rms are
more expensive and less adapted to local requirements. In this case there would be a negative
forward spillover.
The current empirical literature implicitly assumes spillovers to be constant over time,
at best only allowing spillover e⁄ects to kick in with a time lag. This is shown as the
bold line in ￿gure 2. Allowing for a time lag would cause the bold line to shift to the
right. One can easily infer that whether a ￿rm has been present for one, 10 or 20 years in
the host country is assumed irrelevant for the spillover e⁄ect. In the introduction however,
we discussed that most spillovers, horizontal or vertical, are probably dynamic by nature.
Workers need to receive training and adsorb technologies before they can move to a domestic
￿rm to improve the latter￿ s productivity. Enhanced foreign competition may initially hurt
domestic companies before it makes them better. If foreign a¢ liates tend to increase their
local sourcing over time, backward spillovers will not rise to their full e⁄ect immediately. The
presence of better foreign inputs probably requires an adaptation e⁄ort, before domestic ￿rms
can reap the full bene￿ts of it. The dashed line in ￿gure 2 shows a hypothetical dynamic
pattern where the spillover e⁄ect is negative at ￿rst, say there is an adjustment cost, then
becomes positive and ￿nally fades out.
Our dynamic approach requires that we employ a measure of spillover variables that
di⁄ers from the current literature. Typically, the horizontal spillover variable Horizontaljt
captures the degree of foreign presence in sector j at time t and is measured as:
Horizontaljt =
P
i2j Fit ￿ Yit P
i2j Yit
(1)
where Yit is the output produced by ￿rm i in year t. Horizontaljt is industry j￿ s share
of output that is produced by foreign ￿rms. Foreign ￿rms are identi￿ed by Fit. A ￿rm is
classi￿ed as foreign when foreign participation exceeds 10%.1 In the literature Fit either is
the exact share of foreign participation in ￿rm i in year t (but set to zero if it is smaller than
1This threshold level is commonly applied (e.g. by the OECD or the IMF) in FDI de￿nitions.
6number of years foreign






Figure 2: Spillover e⁄ects to domestic ￿rms￿productivity as a function of the number of years
of activity in the domestic market by the foreign ￿rm: current literature versus dynamic
approach
0.1), or alternatively, Fit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if ￿rm i is foreign in
year t and 0 otherwise. In our empirical analysis below we will consider both a dummy and
share version of our spillover variables.





￿jkt ￿ Horizontalkt (2)
where ￿jkt is the proportion of industry j￿ s output supplied to sourcing industry k at time t.
The ￿s are calculated from (possibly time-varying) IO-tables for intermediate consumption.
Inputs sold within the ￿rm￿ s industry are excluded (k 6= j) because this is captured by
Horizontaljt. Since ￿rms cannot easily or quickly switch industries to buy inputs, this
approach avoids the problem of endogeneity by using the share of industry output sold to
downstream domestic markets k with some level of foreign presence Horizontalkt. Employing
the share of ￿rm output sold to foreign ￿rms in di⁄erent industries would cause endogeneity
problems if the latter prefer to buy inputs from more productive domestic ￿rms. In the same




￿jlt ￿ Horizontallt (3)
where the IO-tables reveal the proportion ￿jlt of industry j￿ s inputs purchased from upstream
industries l. Inputs purchased within the industry (l 6= j) are again excluded, since this is
already captured by Horizontal. Horizontaljt, Backwardjt, and Forwardjt are then related
to domestic ￿rms￿productivity to infer the direction, magnitude and signi￿cance of spillovers.
As pointed out in the introduction, this typical de￿nition of Horizontaljt in (1) lumps
together all current and previous foreign investment in a single spillover variable and therefore
implicitly assumes that the impact of a foreign ￿rm on the domestic ￿rm￿ s productivity is
constant over time. Since theory allows us to suspect that spillovers might be dynamic,
rather than static, we de￿ne "e" di⁄erent versions of the horizontal spillover variable instead
of the single measure in (1) in order to capture these possible dynamic e⁄ects. Speci￿cally
we want to test whether the time since entry has an impact on the spillover e⁄ect. Therefore
we de￿ne the variable Horizontale
jt in (4) as industry j￿ s share of output at time t produced
by foreign ￿rms that have been present in the host (domestic) economy for more than e￿1,
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and to zero otherwise.
For e equal to 2, Horizontal2
jt is industry j￿ s share of output that is produced by foreign
￿rms that have entered the domestic market more then one, but less than two years before
t. Time varying de￿nitions for Backwarde
jt, and Forwarde

















83 Empirical approach and Data
3.1 Empirical approach
FDI spillovers are commonly analyzed in a production function framework. Total factor pro-
ductivity at the ￿rm level is obtained in a ￿rst step estimation and in a second step the FDI
spillover variables Horizontal, Backward, and Forward, together with some further con-
trols are treated as additional ￿ input￿explaining domestic ￿rms￿productivity. The resulting
coe¢ cients are then taken as evidence of FDI spillover e⁄ects. The careful estimation of pro-
duction functions is thus an important building block in the analysis. The basic problem in
estimating productivity is that ￿rms react to ￿rm-speci￿c productivity shocks that are often
not observed by the researcher. Griliches and Mairesse (1995) provide a detailed account of
this problem and make the case that inputs should be treated as endogenous variables since
they are chosen on the basis of the ￿rm￿ s unobservable assessment of its productivity. OLS
estimates of production functions therefore yield biased estimates of factor shares and biased
estimates of productivity.2 The semi-parametric approaches by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP)
and a more recent modi￿cation of it by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP), and the dynamic
panel data approach by Blundell and Bond (1998) (DPD) are alternative methodologies to
overcome the endogeneity bias in estimating production functions. Both types of methodolo-
gies have been widely used in the recent literature on ￿rm level heterogeneity for derivation
of total factor productivity measures. More recently, Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) argue
that, while there are some solid and intuitive identi￿cation ideas in the paper by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), their semi-parametric techniques su⁄er from collinearity problems casting
doubt on the methodology. They suggest alternative methodologies that make use of the
ideas in these papers, but do not su⁄er from these collinearity problems. Ackerberg et al.
(2008) also compare their semi-parametric approach to the estimators used in the dynamic
panel literature and conclude that one may try both techniques in the absence of clear guid-
ance from data considerations and/or a-priori beliefs about a particular production process.
While details on the methodology appear in those papers, it is su¢ cient here to note that
they allow for ￿rm-speci￿c productivity di⁄erences that exhibit idiosyncratic changes over
time.
We estimate domestic industry production functions for each Nace 2-digit manufacturing
industry j in the period 1996￿ 2005 separately, excluding ￿rms that are foreign at some
point in time from the estimation. Capital, labor, and material inputs elasticities are thus
industry-speci￿c. A measure of total factor productivity tfpijt for ￿rm i in industry j at
2Speci￿cally, the coe¢ cient of labor is biased upwards, while the capital coe¢ cient is biased downwards.
9time t is obtained as the di⁄erence between output and capital, labor, and material inputs,
multiplied by their estimated coe¢ cients:
tfpijt = Yijt ￿ b ￿ljlijt ￿ b ￿kjkijt ￿ b ￿mjmijt (7)
In the second step, we relate tfpijt to a ￿rm speci￿c e⁄ect, a vector of spillover variables,
FDIjt, a control for competition, and time dummies (￿t). Note that (8) now pools ￿rms
from all industries together in one large panel, whereas (7) is estimated by industry. This
speci￿cation follows the standard in the literature (e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004)
tfpijt = ￿i + ￿1f (FDIjt￿1) + ￿2Hjt + ￿t + "ijt (8)
The vector of spillover variables (FDIjt￿1) covers the di⁄erent horizontal and vertical
spillover variables described in (1)-(6). Considering the time span of our dataset (1996-2005)
we opt to include Horizontal1
jt￿1 to Horizontal4
jt￿1 and create a variable Horizontal
5+
jt￿1
which lumps together all foreign ￿rms that have been present for at least four years on the
domestic market. This reduces the time span of our dependent variable 2000-2005 because
of missing values for Horizontal2
jt to Horizontal
5+
jt . We control for a competition index,
Hjt, measured by the Her￿ndahl index.
Speci￿cation (8) is ￿rst-di⁄erenced and then estimated by OLS, including industry (￿j)
and region dummies (￿r). Because FDIjt and Hjt are de￿ned at the industry level, and
estimations are performed at the ￿rm level, standard errors need to be adjusted (Moulton,
1990). Standard errors are clustered for all observations in the same industry and year. This
results in (9) as ￿nal speci￿cation to be estimated.
￿tfpijrt = ￿1￿f (FDIjt￿1) + ￿2￿Hjt + ￿t + ￿j + ￿r + "ijrt (9)
3.2 Data
We use ￿rm-level data for a panel of Romanian manufacturing ￿rms during 1996￿ 2005. Be-
cause most foreign investment entered Romania after 1996, Romania makes a very good
candidate to study the dynamic impact of recent foreign investment on domestic ￿rm pro-
ductivity. As can be seen from ￿gure 3 Romania started attracting large FDI in￿ ows only
late in transition. The slow pace in the early 1990s of both privatization e⁄orts and market-
oriented reform in general made Romania an unattractive place to invest relative to the
other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It was only in 1997 that Romania
really embarked on privatization. In 2004 FDI in￿ ows took o⁄ on a larger scale. Early 2008
Austria (21.4%), The Netherlands (16.3%), Germany (11.7%), France (8.8%) and Greece
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Figure 3: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania 1990-2005
(7.5%) were the most import home countries of foreign ￿rms in Romania. Manufacturing
accounted for about 40% of total foreign investment, metal (7.5%) and food and tobacco
(5.2%) are the most important subsectors. Banking and insurance (23.3%) , wholesale and
retail (14%), and telecommunication (6,5%) are the other important industries in terms of
FDI.
Our ￿rm-level data are taken from the Amadeus database by Bureau Van Dijk. Amadeus
is a pan-European database of ￿nancial information on public and private companies. About
every month Bureau Van Dijk issues a new DVD with updated information. Therefore a
single issue contains only the latest information on ownership. Firms that go out of business
are dropped from the database fairly rapidly. Because Bureau Van Dijk updates individual
ownership links between legal entities rather than the full ownership structure of a given ￿rm,
the ownership information on a speci￿c DVD-issue often consists of a number of ownership
links with di⁄erent dates, referring to the last veri￿cation of the speci￿c links. To construct
our dataset with entry, exit, and time-speci￿c foreign entry in local Romanian ￿rms, we
therefore employed a series of di⁄erent issues of the database. However, since ownership
information is gathered at irregular intervals, we do not have ownership information for all
years, owners, and ￿rms.3 Given this speci￿cities of Amadeus, we ￿rst created a dataset at
the ￿rm-owner-year-level with the available information from Amadeus. We then ￿lled out
3Identifying the same owner in di⁄erent issues is not always straightforward since an ID is only listed in
case the owner is a ￿rm that is listed in Amadeus itself. For all other owners matching is done on the basis
of the name. Di⁄erences in spacings, plurals, addition to the name of a company-type, the use of characters
speci￿c to Romanian versus standard Roman characters, ... in di⁄erent issues are corrected for.
11missing ￿rm-owner-year-entries under restriction that the full ownership structure cannot
exceed 100%. In case of time gaps between entries for the same owner-￿rm combination but
with a di⁄erent share-size we assume that changes show up immediately in the database.
We then ￿ll out the gaps with the older information.4
Data are de￿ ated using industry price level data at Nace rev.1.1 2-digit level5. These
are taken from the Industrial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for
International Economic Studies and from the Statistical Yearbook of the Romanian National
Statistical O¢ ce (RNSO). IO tables for the period 1996￿ 2005 were obtained from the RNSO.
The tables are in national industry classi￿cation, but the RNSO provided a mapping into
Nace rev. 1.1. Real output Y is measured as operating revenues de￿ ated by producer price
indices of the appropriate Nace industry; real material inputs M, are de￿ ated by a weighted
intermediate input de￿ ator where the industry-speci￿c weighting scheme is drawn from the
IO tables. Labor L is expressed as the number of employees. Real capital K is measured as
￿xed assets, de￿ ated by the average of the de￿ ators for the following ￿ve Nace industries:
machinery and equipment (29); o¢ ce machinery and computing (30); electrical machinery
and apparatus (31); motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other transport
equipment (35) (see Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004).
The dataset is trimmed for outliers by calculating annual growth rates of real operating
revenues, real capital, labour, and real material inputs and then removing the top and bottom
percentiles for each variable. If the "outlier" is the ￿rst or last observation for a speci￿c ￿rm,
the other ￿rm-year data are kept, if not the ￿rm is entirely dropped from the dataset. Our
preferred dataset is further reduced by excluding ￿rms with on average less than 5 employees
over the sample period. Table 1 lists the annual number of ￿rms, and the entry and exit rate
of all ￿rms and for the subsample of foreign ￿rms. The share of foreign ￿rms in the total
number of sample ￿rms steadily increased from 16% to 22% (10 to 15% if small ￿rms are not
excluded). Most of the foreign entry takes the form of "green￿eld" investment, in the sense
that the ￿rm immediately enters the dataset as a foreign ￿rm. Our dataset contains 377
acquisitions, i.e. a switch from domestic to foreign ownership. The 2003 exit rate is high,
but this pattern is con￿rmed by the pattern in the Romanian Trade Register (Trade Register
data also include agriculture and services though). Table 2 lists summary statistics both for
4Alternatively, we assume that it takes time for changes to get noted and that they show up
ex post in the database. We then ￿ll out the gaps with the more recent information. e.g.
Amadeus immediate ex post
2000 40 40 40
2001 . 40 50
2002 50 50 50
Results based on the "ex post" assumption are available in on request.
5Nomenclature gØnØrale des activitØs Øconomiques dans les CommunautØs europØennes.
12domestic and foreign ￿rms. The stylized facts commonly found in the literature are con￿rmed
in our dataset. Foreign ￿rms are larger in terms of employment and capital, produce more
output and are more productive. The latter holds across di⁄erent estimation techniques.
The productivity bonus of foreign over domestic ￿rms ranges between 14% in case of the
Olley-Pakes methodology (OP) and 36% in case of the Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (LP).
Table 3 indicates a fairly high correlation between the tfp-measures resulting from di⁄erent
estimation techniques. For our empirical results we will mainly rely on the tfp measure
obtained by the methodology proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2008). Finally, table 4 shows
the sector breakdown of the spillover variables for the ￿rst and last year of our sample. Left
aside the highly concentrated tobacco industry (Nace 16)6, on average (over industries) some
15% of industry output was produced by foreign ￿rms in 1995. The share of foreign ￿rms
varies between 7% and 30%. In 2005 on average 39% of industry output was produced by
foreign ￿rms, while shares varied between 15% and 57% across industries. The correlation
across years and spillovers is limited.
4 Results
4.1 The impact of entry timing
< insert table 5 and 6 >
Table 5 presents the estimation results for a baseline, non-dynamic speci￿cation as found
in the literature. The ￿rst four columns all use the tfp measure resulting from the ACF
methodology and di⁄er in either the sample size (including or excluding ￿rms with less
than 5 employees on average) or in the de￿nition of the spillover variables (share or dummy
version). The backward spillover e⁄ect is signi￿cant and positive in all four estimations. This
suggests that Romanian manufacturing ￿rms have bene￿ted from supplying foreign ￿rms.
Horizontal spillovers are positive and signi￿cant, especially when the share de￿nition is used
(columns 1 and 3). The presence of foreign competitors seems to have contributed positively
to domestic ￿rms￿productivity growth. The forward spillover is also only signi￿cant when the
share version is used. It is negatively signed, implying that ￿rm-level productivity is lower
for ￿rms in industries that source inputs from industries with a larger foreign presence.
Columns 5 to 7 generally con￿rm these ￿ndings using tfp measures obtained using other
methodologies (DPD, OP, LP).
6Including or excluding the tobacco industry does not a⁄ect our results.
13In table 6 we allow FDI spillovers to di⁄er according to the timing of entry of the foreign
￿rm. In order not to reduce the time dimension of our panel too much7, we created for each
spillover a 4+ variable that brings together all foreign ￿rms that have been present for at
least four years on the domestic market. One could think of the coe¢ cient of this variable as
an aggregate longer term e⁄ect. Further note that the average values of these 4+ variables
are considerably larger than the variables capturing entry in a more recent speci￿c year. We
need to take this into account when interpreting coe¢ cients and the variables￿contribution
to ￿rm-level productivity growth. Gauging across speci￿cations and di⁄erent tfp measures,
the results generally suggest that the positive horizontal spillover is an e⁄ect on a longer
horizon. Firms that recently entered the domestic economy have no or in some speci￿cations
a negative e⁄ect, whereas ￿rms that have been present for more than four years generate
strong positive spillovers that are signi￿cant in all 7 columns of table 6. This is a clear
indication that it takes time for domestic ￿rms to adjust to new competition and novelties
introduced by foreign entrants. Longer established foreign ￿rms on the other hand positively
a⁄ect domestic ￿rm productivity. The backward spillover presents a di⁄erent story. Here the
impact on domestic ￿rm productivity is faster than for the horizontal spillover, although it
still seems to take a year before positive e⁄ects are observed. The strongest positive backward
spillovers are found for foreign ￿rms that entered between one and two years ago. There is
a smaller, but still positive e⁄ect for ￿rms entering between two and four years earlier, but
the evidence is more mixed across samples and tfp measures. A longer term e⁄ect is absent.
This suggest that domestic ￿rms that supply new foreign entrants enjoy higher productivity
growth for a couple of years, but only after a short adjustment period. With respect to the
forward spillover no signi￿cant impact remains.
Focusing on columns (1) to (4), the results again slightly di⁄er between the share and
dummy versions. The share versions seem to be more indicative of a time pattern than the
dummy versions. Therefore we focus on the role of ownership structure in more detail in the
next section.
4.2 The impact of ownership structure
Since the dummy version abstracts from any ownership structure detail, whereas the share
version does not, the di⁄erent results for dummy and share versions in table 6 indicate that
ownership structure may matter. On the one hand, local participation in a foreign invest-
ment project reveals the foreign ￿rm￿ s proprietary technology, which facilitates spillovers
(Blomstr￿m and Sj￿holm, 1999). On the other hand, the fear of technology leakage on be-
7E.g. in case of Horizontal6
jt we observe ￿rms that have been present between 5 and 6 years on the
domestic market only from 2001 onwards, prior to 2001 this variable only contains missing values.
14half of the foreign ￿rm will induce foreign ￿rms to bring in less advanced technology or to shy
away from shared ownership when bringing in their more sophisticated technologies. Desai
et al. (2004) for example ￿nd evidence that majority subsidiaries receive more intangible
property from their parent companies than do minority foreign owned ￿rms. Furthermore,
advanced technologies o⁄er a larger scope for spillovers, but may impede knowledge di⁄usion
to local ￿rms operating in the same sector if the latter lack su¢ cient absorptive capacity.
With respect to backward spillovers Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) ￿nd pos-
itive e⁄ects only for spillovers from minority foreign owned ￿rms. They argue that due to
greater technological sophistication majority foreign owned ￿rms may require more complex
inputs that may be more di¢ cult for local ￿rms to provide. Therefore, they may be less
likely to engage in local sourcing than a¢ liates with shared ownership.
Therefore we allow spillovers to di⁄er for majority and minority foreign owned ￿rms.
This is done by considering two versions of (1) where our single foreign ownership variable
Fit is now broken down in two versions F M
it and F m
it . F M
it is the share of majority foreign
participation (50% or more) in ￿rm i in year t, and is set to zero if foreign participation
is smaller than 50%. Likewise F m
it is then the share of minority foreign participation (less
than 50%, but more than 10%) in ￿rm i in year t, and is set to zero if foreign participation
exceeds 50% or is smaller than 10%. Dummy variable versions of F M
it and F m
it can be de￿ned
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(10) and (11) can then be used to generate both majority and minority foreign owned
versions of all the previously de￿ned spillover variables along the lines of (1)-(6).
Table 7 presents the results for the split between majority and minority foreign owned
￿rms, but still abstracting from entry timing patterns. Whether the foreign investment is
conducted by majority or minority foreign owned ￿rms has a considerable impact on the
sign and magnitude of the associated spillover. This conclusion is very robust over di⁄erent
samples (columns 1 to 4) and alternative tfp measures (columns 5 to 7). In case of hori-
zontal spillovers, it turns out that only majority foreign owned ￿rms generate clear positive
spillovers, whereas minority foreign owned ￿rms generate insigni￿cant negative spillovers.
Probably the more advanced technology brought in by majority foreign owned ￿rms gener-
15ates larger technology spillovers to domestic ￿rms. The backward spillover is positive and
signi￿cant for both types of foreign ownership, but point estimates reveal a much higher
impact of minority foreign owned ￿rms, in line with Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu
(2008). However, calculating the actual contribution of foreign investment to the produc-
tivity of Romanian ￿rms with point estimates and sample averages reveals that the impact
from majority foreign-owned ￿rms was actually larger, essentially because the amount of
majority foreign investment was much larger (see table 2). The negative forward spillover
e⁄ect is entirely due to sourcing inputs from majority foreign owned ￿rms. Probably these
inputs are too complex and possibly too expensive for domestic ￿rms to deal with.
< insert table 7 and 8>
In table 8 we jointly consider ownership structure and timing of entry e⁄ects. The dy-
namic e⁄ects of minority and majority foreign entry on the productivity of local competitors
and local suppliers that are implied by speci￿cation (1) in table 8 are visualised in ￿gure 4
below. The positive horizontal spillover e⁄ect from table 5 appears to be largely driven by
a long term positive spillover e⁄ect from majority foreign owned ￿rms. This result is very
robust across samples and measures of tfp. The horizontal spillover from majority foreign
owned ￿rms turns negative if they entered between t-1 and t-2 and signi￿cantly negative
if they entered between t-2 and t-3.This is reversed in the longer run, where the spillover
turns strongly positive. This is consistent with the thesis that the advanced technology of
majority foreign owned ￿rms drives the positive spillover, but that it takes time and e⁄ort
to absorb this advanced technology. It is also consistent with a labour market theory of
spillovers. Majority foreign owned entrants may initially push up local wages and poach the
best talents, yielding a negative spillover. But a few years later local employees that have
received on the job training from the majority foreign owned ￿rm may quit to join domestic
￿rms or set up their own ￿rm, reversing the e⁄ect. The productivity spillovers from minority
foreign owned ￿rms are much smaller (they also account for a substantially smaller share
of industry output). The initial impact seems to be insigni￿cant, but the spillover turns
strongly negative for ￿rms that entered between t-3 and t-4. Taking into account average
values of the variables concerned, we may conclude that the spillovers from minority foreign
owned ￿rms are fairly small relative to these from majority foreign owned ￿rms (cf. ￿gure
4).
Minority foreign owned ￿rms, however, do generate immediate and strong positive back-
ward spillover e⁄ects. The ￿rst two years after entry domestic ￿rms enjoy a substantial
contribution to productivity growth. Bearing in mind the summary statistics, the large co-



































Figure 4: Impact of a one standard deviation increase in the respective spillover variables on
local ￿rm productivity implied by speci￿cation (1) of table 8 (bold borders indicate statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cients; average log productivity of domestic ￿rms is 5.62)
17productivity growth, but altogether not an unrealistically large one. The positive backward
spillover is large but short-lived. The e⁄ect even turns signi￿cantly negative if the minority
foreign owned ￿rms entered between t-3 and t-4, although the coe¢ cient remains compar-
atively small. The longer run coe¢ cients are negative but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. Backward spillovers from majority foreign owned ￿rms are also positive, but the e⁄ect
is less immediate and longer lived than for minority foreign owned ￿rms. Majority foreign
owned ￿rms need to be present for at least a full year for domestic ￿rms to grasp positive
backward spillover e⁄ects, but positive e⁄ects are enjoyed up to 4 years after foreign entry.
The longer run coe¢ cients are again insigni￿cant.
These results are consistent with the thesis that domestic ￿rms receive immediate, well
tailored assistance from the minority foreign owned entrant they supply. Given a domestic
majority, the minority foreign owned ￿rms are probably better aware of possible constraints
at their domestic suppliers and more willing to provide assistance. The foreign minority
shareholder may on the other hand not bring in its most advanced technologies, implying a
limited scope for spillovers. Hence an immediate, but rather short-lived positive contribution
to productivity growth. For domestic ￿rms supplying to majority foreign owned ￿rms it may
take more time to bene￿t from this relationship, because they need to get acquainted with
the demands and technologies of their majority foreign owned clients, but bene￿ts are large
and positive once they arrive and they last longer. A lasting impact is absent as well, however.
With respect to forward spillovers the strongly negative impact on productivity of sourc-
ing inputs from majority owned foreign ￿rms previously observed in table 7 disappears when
timing is taken into account. There seems to be a negative impact from ￿rms that entered
between t-1 & t-2 but the statistical support is at best mixed. The absence of strong forward
spillover e⁄ects is in line with most of the literature (see e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004,
and Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008).
5 Conclusions
This study analyzes horizontal and vertical productivity spillovers of foreign direct invest-
ment on domestic Romanian manufacturing companies from 1996 to 2005. We add to the
literature by relaxing the assumption that spillovers are constant and permanent. We al-
low the spillovers to vary over time according to the timing of foreign entry. We ￿nd that
spillovers from foreign investments indeed vary over time in ways that are economically
intuitive and consistent with economic theory. In the short run backward spillovers seem
to dominate the analysis, but in the longer run horizontal spillovers emerge as important
channels of productivity spillovers too. More speci￿cally, domestic ￿rms seem to experience
18positive horizontal spillover e⁄ects from majority foreign owned ￿rms, but only in the longer
run. This is consistent with the thesis that domestic ￿rms need time and e⁄ort to absorb
the foreign technology, but also with the labour market channel of spillovers. The horizontal
impact of minority foreign owned ￿rms, who account for a substantially smaller share of
industry output, is much smaller. Minority foreign owned ￿rms do generate immediate and
strong positive backward spillover e⁄ects though. The ￿rst two years after entry, domestic
￿rms that supply minority foreign entrants enjoy a substantial contribution to productivity
growth, but this positive impact fades out rather quickly. Backward spillovers from major-
ity foreign owned ￿rms are also positive, but the e⁄ect is less immediate and longer lived,
though it also fades out in the longer run. We do not ￿nd strong evidence for the existence
of forward spillovers, a ￿nding that is in line with most of the literature. Attracting foreign
direct investment therefore raises the level of local ￿rm productivity, but contrary to what
the literature has implictly been assuming the impact of foreign presence depends strongly
on its maturity.
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22# firms entry exit # firms entry exit penetration
1996 14,393 2,242 0.16
1997 15,618 1057 91 2,615 315 32 0.17
1998 16,768 996 190 3,005 328 59 0.18
1999 18,054 1200 761 3,464 373 169 0.19
2000 19,480 1845 301 3,940 472 72 0.20
2001 20,908 1374 507 4,458 445 119 0.21
2002 21,912 1224 988 4,792 332 305 0.22
2003 22,579 1336 2447 4,896 298 493 0.22
2004 21,525 1066 562 4,831 314 168 0.22
2005 20,963 4,667 0.22
All firms of which Foreign firms
Table 1: Number of ￿rms, entry, and exit by year
mean sd mean sd mean sd
ln(real output) 13.74 1.90 13.53 1.84 14.52 1.94
ln(employment) 98.97 432.98 83.11 394.16 160.49 554.31
ln(capital) 12.08 2.32 11.82 2.26 13.06 2.29
ln(real value added) 12.67 2.09 12.43 2.03 13.62 2.05
ln(tfp)  ACF 5.74 1.52 5.69 1.52 5.95 1.47
ln(tfp) OP 2.09 0.87 2.06 0.85 2.20 0.94
ln(tfp)  LP 6.93 1.79 6.86 1.81 7.22 1.70
ln(tfp)  DPD 2.30 1.29 2.27 1.27 2.42 1.33
ln(tfp)  OLS 2.43 1.01 2.39 0.98 2.61 1.10
ln(tfp)  FE 2.00 0.96 1.95 0.91 2.21 1.11
mean sd mean sd mean sd
horizontal dummy 0.40 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.06 0.12
horizontal share 0.28 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.04
backward dummy 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.05
backward share 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.02
forward dummy 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.03







Spillovers (industry-year; n = 649)
All firms Domestic firms Foreign firms
n = 133154 n = 105854 n = 27300
Table 2: Summary statistics for ￿rm-level and industry level variables
23OLS FE DPD Lpva OP
FE 0.87
DPD 0.69 0.60
Lpva 0.57 0.39 0.69
OP 0.91 0.75 0.68 0.58
ACF 0.67 0.54 0.50 0.87 0.65
Table 3: Correlation between di⁄erent productivity measures
Nace # firms horizontal backward forward # firms horizontal backward forward
15 4,138 0.22 0.11 0.07 4,712 0.40 0.20 0.19
16 3 0.00 0.10 0.02 17 0.85 0.23 0.09
17 695 0.10 0.11 0.04 1,024 0.45 0.27 0.16
18 1,509 0.17 0.11 0.10 2,671 0.43 0.24 0.37
19 501 0.17 0.06 0.07 1,082 0.56 0.18 0.26
20 1,324 0.08 0.09 0.07 1,989 0.46 0.22 0.12
21 193 0.13 0.17 0.06 282 0.42 0.28 0.23
22 807 0.23 0.16 0.12 1,016 0.34 0.14 0.19
23 17 0.18 0.10 0.10 28 0.57 0.25 0.18
24 432 0.13 0.13 0.12 517 0.42 0.27 0.21
25 528 0.15 0.10 0.06 859 0.34 0.24 0.13
26 530 0.11 0.09 0.10 815 0.24 0.24 0.25
27 158 0.13 0.09 0.08 220 0.43 0.26 0.22
28 1,281 0.09 0.08 0.09 2,101 0.25 0.25 0.34
29 437 0.08 0.09 0.10 640 0.29 0.26 0.37
30 104 0.30 0.12 0.10 132 0.13 0.23 0.18
31 203 0.16 0.08 0.09 348 0.50 0.19 0.23
32 61 0.18 0.09 0.04 84 0.51 0.29 0.28
33 154 0.07 0.16 0.12 231 0.15 0.27 0.32
34 149 0.07 0.06 0.10 209 0.55 0.18 0.36
35 133 0.17 0.05 0.11 268 0.49 0.09 0.37
36 1,036 0.16 0.15 0.09 1,718 0.36 0.21 0.35
1996 2005
Table 4: Values for horizontal, forward, and backward in 1996 and 2005)
24(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACF ACF ACF ACF DPD OP LP
share dummy share dummy share share share
> 5L > 5L all all > 5L > 5L > 5L
horizontal 1.390*** 0.684** 1.341*** 0.539 0.392*** 0.363** 1.366***
[0.399] [0.306] [0.454] [0.337] [0.143] [0.142] [0.401]
backward 2.168** 1.583** 2.332** 1.493** 1.103*** 1.037*** 2.137**
[0.875] [0.677] [0.952] [0.719] [0.281] [0.292] [0.881]
forward -3.039*** -0.895 -3.334*** -1.139 -1.118*** -1.212*** -3.047***
[0.964] [0.752] [0.939] [0.756] [0.346] [0.360] [0.964]
N 81002 81002 132084 132084 108482 108430 88071
R-squared 0.091 0.086 0.073 0.068 0.054 0.054 0.098
Second-step OLS estimates for domestic firms; regressions include industry, time, and region dummies;
control variables included are industry competition, import competition and firm age. The dependent
variable is first-differenced firm level TFP based on first-step production function estimates by industry
according to the indicated methodology. Columns (2) and (4) use the dummy version of the spillover
variables. All columns are based on the sample of firms with on average more than 5 employees, except
columns (3) and (4) that are based on the sample of all firms. Robust t-statistics in brackets; */**/*** denotes
significance at 10/5/1 percent.
Table 5: Time invariant spillover e⁄ects
25(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACF ACF ACF ACF DPD OP LP
Share dummy share dummy share share share
> 5L > 5L all all > 5L > 5L > 5L
entry ...
horizontal
after t-1 0.500 0.096 0.976 0.221 0.012 0.068 0.494
[0.729] [0.553] [0.795] [0.636] [0.247] [0.257] [0.750]
between t-1 & t-2 -1.178 -0.627 -1.100 -0.906 -0.580** -0.622** -1.199
[0.828] [0.537] [0.923] [0.591] [0.266] [0.280] [0.838]
between t-2 & t-3 -1.368* -0.473 -1.219* -0.784 -0.582** -0.594** -1.373*
[0.756] [0.567] [0.690] [0.525] [0.236] [0.243] [0.771]
between t-3 & t-4 0.673 0.215 0.448 -0.118 0.077 0.074 0.688
[0.548] [0.509] [0.535] [0.508] [0.144] [0.147] [0.555]
before t-4 2.046*** 1.221*** 1.999*** 1.023** 0.383*** 0.380*** 2.007***
[0.415] [0.329] [0.508] [0.400] [0.113] [0.113] [0.418]
backward
after t-1 5.102 0.104 4.134 -0.286 2.093 2.358* 4.727
[4.205] [2.372] [4.572] [3.172] [1.350] [1.368] [4.287]
between t-1 & t-2 9.463*** 5.031** 8.898*** 5.075* 3.350*** 3.424*** 9.503***
[3.277] [2.440] [3.248] [2.637] [1.118] [1.117] [3.378]
between t-2 & t-3 3.900* 1.841 3.997* 2.024 1.727** 1.823*** 3.652
[2.206] [1.401] [2.367] [1.462] [0.693] [0.697] [2.223]
between t-3 & t-4 5.635* 1.739 4.322* 1.353 2.496*** 2.538*** 5.546*
[2.974] [1.741] [2.330] [1.398] [0.799] [0.788] [3.029]
before t-4 -0.665 -0.379 0.028 0.034 0.159 0.063 -0.662
[1.208] [1.017] [1.257] [1.021] [0.362] [0.366] [1.233]
forward
after t-1 0.358 -0.253 0.799 0.226 0.515 0.359 0.346
[2.103] [1.495] [2.153] [1.508] [0.604] [0.612] [2.077]
between t-1 & t-2 -0.455 -0.127 -1.279 -0.772 -0.527 -0.593 -0.447
[1.206] [1.103] [1.233] [1.083] [0.372] [0.382] [1.197]
between t-2 & t-3 -0.586 -1.561 -1.357 -1.967 -0.315 -0.352 -0.550
[2.297] [1.646] [2.322] [1.730] [0.675] [0.676] [2.286]
between t-3 & t-4 0.817 1.595 -0.927 0.507 -0.156 -0.294 0.938
[2.455] [2.284] [2.469] [2.147] [0.710] [0.730] [2.509]
before t-4 1.038 1.620* 0.602 1.066 0.417 0.393 1.158
[0.997] [0.881] [0.999] [0.892] [0.311] [0.313] [0.996]
N 51561 51565 82385 82389 65373 65346 55002
R-squared 0.068 0.060 0.051 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.066
Second-step OLS estimates for domestic firms; regressions include industry, time, and region dummies;
control variables included are industry competition, import competition and firm age. The dependent
variable is first-differenced firm level TFP based on first-step production function estimates by industry
according to the indicated methodology. Columns (2) and (4) use the dummy version of the spillover
variables. All columns are based on the sample of firms with on average more than 5 employees, except
columns (3) and (4) that are based on the sample of all firms. Robust t-statistics in brackets; */**/*** denotes
significance at 10/5/1 percent.
Table 6: Time varying spillover e⁄ects
26(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACF ACF ACF ACF DPD OP LP
share dummy share dummy share share share
> 5L > 5L all all > 5L > 5L > 5L
horizontal-maj 1.466*** 1.304*** 1.450*** 1.315*** 0.392*** 0.367*** 1.432***
[0.388] [0.342] [0.441] [0.384] [0.140] [0.140] [0.390]
horizontal-min -0.783 -0.189 -1.603 -0.390 -0.163 -0.177 -0.762
[1.018] [0.284] [1.018] [0.278] [0.276] [0.274] [1.012]
backward-maj 1.786** 1.768** 2.092** 2.099** 0.998*** 0.948*** 1.749*
[0.896] [0.784] [0.972] [0.824] [0.301] [0.309] [0.901]
backward-min 10.257*** 3.469*** 6.651 3.086*** 4.172*** 3.598** 10.413***
[3.242] [0.715] [4.331] [0.815] [1.443] [1.709] [3.107]
forward-maj -3.175*** -2.546*** -3.474*** -2.820*** -1.192*** -1.277*** -3.200***
[0.977] [0.773] [0.965] [0.776] [0.363] [0.377] [0.977]
forward-min 4.014 1.267 1.943 0.694 1.502 1.076 4.554
[3.325] [1.128] [3.781] [1.252] [1.283] [1.316] [3.308]
N 81002 81002 132084 132084 108482 108430 88071
R-squared 0.098 0.101 0.077 0.080 0.058 0.057 0.105
Second-step OLS estimates for domestic firms; regressions include industry, time, and region dummies;
control variables included are industry competition, import competition and firm age. The dependent
variable is first-differenced firm level TFP based on first-step production function estimates by industry
according to the indicated methodology. Columns (2) and (4) use the dummy version of the spillover
variables. All columns are based on the sample of firms with on average more than 5 employees, except
columns (3) and (4) that are based on the sample of all firms. Robust t-statistics in brackets; */**/*** denotes
significance at 10/5/1 percent.
Table 7: Time invariant spillover e⁄ects from majority and minority owned foreign ￿rms
27(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACF ACF ACF ACF DPD OP LP
share dummy share dummy share share share
> 5L > 5L all all > 5L > 5L > 5L
entry ...
horizontal-maj
after t-1 0.043 -0.194 0.517 -0.183 -0.142 -0.066 0.017
[0.704] [0.676] [0.756] [0.698] [0.276] [0.280] [0.730]
between t-1 & t-2 -1.321 -1.052 -1.125 -1.192 -0.673* -0.690* -1.394
[1.041] [0.887] [1.104] [0.929] [0.357] [0.377] [1.062]
between t-2 & t-3 -1.843** -1.318* -1.846** -1.638** -0.725*** -0.724*** -1.864**
[0.847] [0.749] [0.799] [0.751] [0.264] [0.275] [0.860]
between t-3 & t-4 0.298 0.276 -0.163 -0.339 0.033 0.037 0.291
[0.662] [0.610] [0.656] [0.631] [0.177] [0.181] [0.673]
before t-4 1.881*** 1.700*** 1.757*** 1.554*** 0.390*** 0.392*** 1.819***
[0.369] [0.396] [0.442] [0.445] [0.108] [0.110] [0.370]
horizontal-min
after t-1 8.883 0.697 17.738** 1.576 2.449 2.713 7.879
[7.968] [2.043] [7.505] [1.990] [2.616] [2.699] [7.924]
between t-1 & t-2 5.129 -0.283 6.698 -0.480 2.225 2.372 4.905
[6.374] [1.181] [5.630] [1.049] [1.984] [2.119] [6.244]
between t-2 & t-3 6.566 -0.789 8.407 -1.258 0.012 0.228 6.520
[9.324] [2.114] [9.563] [2.552] [2.598] [2.646] [9.340]
between t-3 & t-4 -10.573** -1.068 -14.541*** -3.541** -5.464*** -5.070*** -11.160**
[5.019] [1.360] [5.075] [1.526] [1.394] [1.398] [5.038]
before t-4 2.143 0.459 -0.773 -0.506 -0.368 -0.199 1.915
[1.686] [0.493] [1.818] [0.543] [0.499] [0.522] [1.732]
backward-maj
after t-1 2.026 2.067 -7.456 -5.270 1.080 1.129 1.288
[6.702] [6.100] [7.074] [6.319] [2.198] [2.245] [6.823]
between t-1 & t-2 11.782*** 12.869*** 12.294** 13.507*** 4.940*** 5.096*** 11.463**
[4.462] [4.361] [4.876] [4.766] [1.447] [1.465] [4.567]
between t-2 & t-3 4.756** 1.423 4.536* 1.824 2.963*** 3.002*** 4.614**
[2.272] [2.367] [2.497] [2.766] [0.784] [0.788] [2.294]
between t-3 & t-4 13.794*** 7.103** 17.298*** 11.096*** 5.415*** 5.448*** 13.934***
[4.429] [3.293] [4.094] [3.042] [1.248] [1.263] [4.487]
before t-4 -0.255 -0.324 1.029 1.634 0.465 0.366 -0.216
[1.402] [1.239] [1.404] [1.270] [0.476] [0.485] [1.452]
backward-min
after t-1 125.269** 5.767 116.361** 7.898 36.335** 43.261*** 127.242**
[52.667] [5.469] [50.423] [6.183] [16.323] [16.472] [52.850]
between t-1 & t-2 114.866*** 10.829 84.671*** 14.560** 18.874* 20.314* 113.218***
[34.920] [8.575] [23.113] [6.809] [11.207] [11.538] [35.404]
between t-2 & t-3 28.776 10.583* 12.583 9.339 -9.205 -7.576 23.933
[34.169] [6.043] [30.149] [6.770] [11.494] [11.281] [34.755]
between t-3 & t-4 -58.042** -5.161 -82.159*** -11.093 -17.449** -17.611** -63.325**
[24.824] [6.403] [27.246] [7.073] [7.321] [7.337] [25.307]
before t-4 -17.956 -3.282 -12.282 -1.653 -5.109 -4.923 -18.286
[13.427] [3.994] [12.232] [3.699] [4.582] [4.563] [13.816]
28(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACF ACF ACF ACF DPD OP LP
share dummy share dummy share share share
> 5L > 5L all all > 5L > 5L > 5L
forward-maj
after t-1 2.037 -0.224 1.030 -0.051 0.678 0.511 2.129
[2.336] [1.958] [2.439] [1.963] [0.677] [0.692] [2.314]
between t-1 & t-2 -0.982 -1.240 -2.249* -2.450** -0.986** -1.052** -1.056
[1.291] [0.963] [1.306] [0.961] [0.441] [0.455] [1.295]
between t-2 & t-3 1.721 0.220 0.386 0.068 0.279 0.248 1.708
[2.941] [2.238] [2.838] [2.159] [0.830] [0.851] [2.925]
between t-3 & t-4 -0.157 0.302 -2.241 -1.729 -0.676 -0.809 -0.125
[2.600] [2.447] [2.632] [2.442] [0.778] [0.799] [2.653]
before t-4 0.575 0.733 1.024 0.482 0.126 0.150 0.553
[1.532] [1.129] [1.398] [1.153] [0.476] [0.475] [1.549]
forward-min
after t-1 9.291 0.550 15.369 0.277 2.015 -0.268 10.124
[21.885] [8.272] [20.424] [7.962] [6.078] [6.130] [21.994]
between t-1 & t-2 0.585 1.804 9.993 0.385 -2.122 -2.482 -0.198
[13.778] [4.979] [12.446] [4.787] [3.541] [3.680] [13.649]
between t-2 & t-3 -7.532 -11.062 -6.293 -12.834 -6.304 -7.653 -5.717
[26.230] [11.949] [28.127] [12.687] [6.191] [6.415] [26.585]
between t-3 & t-4 16.930 3.345 15.018 4.275 3.862 3.367 18.052
[14.087] [5.222] [13.757] [5.136] [3.951] [3.954] [14.343]
before t-4 7.511** 1.906 4.409 -0.138 2.198* 2.063 7.895**
[3.662] [1.510] [4.221] [1.366] [1.270] [1.292] [3.678]
N 49787 49787 80567 80567 63268 63241 53119
R-squared 0.085 0.076 0.055 0.06 0.044 0.047 0.084
Second-step OLS estimates for domestic firms; regressions include industry, time, and region dummies;
control  variables  included  are  i ndustry  competition,  import  competition  and  firm  age.  The  dependent
variable is first -differenced firm level TFP based on first -step production function estimates by industry
according  to  the  indicated  methodology.  Columns  (2)  and  (4)  use  the  dummy  version of  the  spillover
variables. All columns are based on the sample of firms with on average more than 5 employees, except
columns (3) and (4) that are based on the sample of all firms. Robust t-statistics in brackets; */**/*** denotes
significance at 10/5/1 percent.
Table 8: Time varying spillover e⁄ects from majority and minority owned foreign ￿rms
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